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Race to Finding Myself (1999) could even be found 
on self-help shelves. For Scribner, this self-image is 
continuous with that of the sexist male urban guer-
rilla of the 1960s and 1970s that Fischer once was. 
In distinct contrast, the performance of Meinhof’s 
body shows it to be shattered and abnormal, ghostly, 
force-fed, abused; but this, too, comes to be, in some 
contexts, synonymous with the German state, as an 
entity that is broken and discontinuous. It is also an 
emblem of the fractious and fragmented meanings 
attributed to Ulrike Meinhof, which refuse to resolve. 
Not least within this book. There are various inter-
secting, obliterating, over writing lines explored here: 
art, politics, aestheticization, terror, reform, enlight-
enment, mystification, gender, class. Feminism and 
social change are at the heart of it all. Meinhof’s 
notebooks show her to be critical of feminism. A note 
puts it crudely: ‘Fuck equal rights for women’. But if 
Meinhof was not interested in feminist analysis or 
demands from that perspective, Scribner is.
The final chapter explores the complicity of artists 
and media in confecting the image of the RAF. This 
was the ground that the exhibition Regarding Terror 
explored in 2005, as it put on show the extent to 
which so much art that reflected on the RAF drew on 
newspaper and stock photography. This is indicative, 
according to Scribner, of a ‘mediatized condition’, but 
it is, she asserts, a deceptive one, eclipsing some of the 
other motivations of artists who contributed to the 
show, and also denying the extent to which, through 
art, they transformed the media materials. There are 
other reflections to be had on the legacy, and Scribner 
sets the much-acclaimed ‘sexed-up’ glamfest that is 
Uli Edel’s The Baader–Meinhof Complex (2008; see 
my review in RP 153, January/February 2009) against 
a German–Turkish film by Fatih Akin, The Edge of 
Heaven (2007), which approaches the question of 
political activism and armed resistance in the context 
of post-9/11, relating in the process questions of femi-
nism and its relation to the Far Left. This latter film 
stands as a model of what is needed, phrased by 
Scribner as ‘the power of dialectical mediation’, in 
which diﬀerence is respected, but strategic alliances 
may still be formed. This position Scribner attributes 
to Adorno. But the language is not Adornian really. It 
is a liberal plea to end ‘them’ and ‘us’ conceptualiza-
tions. Essentially it wants a democracy that does 
not use force against its people and a people that 
does not use force against its democracy (assuming 
that democracy has an agreed and stable meaning). 
It recognizes that the Far Left might be the agents, 
unintentionally, of the best reforms, but most of all it 
counsels for more reflection, more culture and more 
books of this kind, to generate ‘new modes of resist-
ance, both critical and aesthetic’. It is most worthy. 
Esther Leslie
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Feed-Forward sets an ambitious goal for itself: that of 
integrating late Husserlian phenomenology with the 
speculative empiricism of Alfred North Whitehead. 
Whitehead is employed by Hansen to make up for 
phenomenology’s inadequacy in conceptualizing the 
ways in which contemporary media are changing 
experience and subjectivity. Hansen’s engagement 
with Whiteheadian ontology is a learned and con-
fident attempt to produce ‘new philosophy for new 
media’ (to paraphrase the title of one of Hansen’s pre-
vious books). The strength of this attempt, however, 
is partly undermined by the fact that Hansen sub-
tracts some key ingredients from Whitehead’s meta-
physical schema in order to add him to the legacy 
of phenomenology. Moreover, in order to relate this 
proposed Whiteheadian phenomenology to contem-
porary media, Hansen’s study can be seen to sidestep 
the technical specificity of the media that it wishes 
to theorize.
The nub of the book’s argument is the claim that 
contemporary media impact upon and participate in 
‘worldly sensibility’ (that is, in Hansen’s words, the 
‘general sensibility of the world’). This participation 
in a broader and distributed domain of sensibility is 
prior to media’s aﬀecting human experience, but also 
a condition for this aﬀecting. The book’s point of 
departure is thus the following observation: human 
experience is undergoing a fundamental change, 
brought about by our entanglement with media tech-
nologies that operate outside our awareness. Drawing 
on media theory’s insight that agency is radically 
environmental, and yet refusing media theory’s dis-
regard for the category of the human (an accusation 
of neglect that is only partially justified in this book), 
Hansen oﬀers a reconceptualization of the global 
experiential patterns of techno/human activity by 
recuperating phenomenology’s attention to subjec-
tivity. The subjectivity that he addresses, however, 
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is an unusual one: it is, again in Hansen’s words, a 
‘non-subject-centred subjectivity’, composed of multi-
scalar processes. Not so much the straightforward 
high-order, singular source of consciousness, atten-
tion and sense perception of traditional phenomenol-
ogy, then, but a post-Husserlian, assemblage-like, 
low-order ‘environmental sensory confound’ that 
Hansen finds to be best conceptualized in terms of 
the mode of organization that Whitehead called a 
society.
A Whiteheadian society is a compositional 
agglomerate of the operations of elemental entities 
that partake in the societal composition as a plu-
rality. Crucially, Hansen takes societies to be the 
principal experiential agents within Whitehead’s 
philosophy, thus explicitly refusing to consider actual 
occasions (i.e. Whitehead’s foundational ontological 
units, which constitute the structure of reality and 
whose achievements form societies) as the main 
active players in Whitehead’s metaphysics of expe-
rience. Drawing on Judith Jones’s interpretation 
of Whitehead (which takes ‘intensity’, understood 
as the power that exceeds individual actual occa-
sions, to be his fundamental category), and also 
following Didier Debaise’s distinction between the 
‘speculative’ (i.e. what concerns the structure of 
reality) and the ‘experiential’ (i.e. what accounts for 
experience) in Whitehead, Hansen empties actual 
occasions, and their concrescent phase, of creative 
value. What Hansen instead addresses as the agent 
of experiential novelty is the Whiteheadian concept 
of superject, arguing that the attained, composite 
status of societal subjectivity (i.e. the superject) best 
describes how humans today co-function with tech-
nology. Our subjective experience, the book claims, 
is born out of the sensory aﬀordances that repose 
in contemporary media situations. This condition, 
Hansen says, shows that humans are not separate and 
superior experiential entities, and that consciousness 
is not the hallmark of subjectivity. In Hansen’s view, 
Whitehead’s philosophy can then be used to rethink 
the environmental dimension of subjectivity vis-à-vis 
the ways in which media are responsible for propagat-
ing a distributed mode of sensibility that is decoupled 
from human perception.
There is much I admire in Hansen’s engagement 
with Whitehead. However, I also have some concerns: 
some arise from disagreements regarding technical 
issues in Whiteheadian scholarship; others pertain 
to our diﬀering opinions about what might be most 
usefully drawn from Whitehead’s ontology. Debating 
who has got the right or wrong version of Whitehead, 
however, is beside the point. Whitehead’s philosophy 
is so complex, and often so unapologetically obscure, 
that there cannot be one Whitehead. The impossibil-
ity of reducing Whitehead’s philosophy to orthodoxy 
attests to its power and richness, and also explains 
the contemporary renaissance that it has come to 
enjoy. Yet, recognition of this potential plurality is 
underdeveloped in Hansen’s 
study. With few exceptions, 
Hansen tends to characterize 
other readings of Whitehead 
as problematic or inadequate. 
These readings are charged 
with being instrumental or 
tactical, and with privileging 
certain aspects of White-
head’s philosophy in order 
to make pre-established 
points. To some extent, this may be true. However, 
and perhaps inevitably, this charge could also be 
applied to Hansen himself, and in a manner that 
goes beyond questions of interpretation. In order to 
forge a kinship between Whitehead and phenom-
enology, Hansen has to choose certain elements of 
Whitehead’s philosophy and discard others. Hansen 
sees this as a sort of correction: as a ‘transformative 
criticism’, or as submitting Whitehead to ‘philo-
sophical critique’. Nonetheless, doubts remain as to 
whether certain dismissals (of parts of Whitehead’s 
metaphysics, as well as of many Whitehead’s past 
and present commentators) are not equally a form of 
instrumentalization.
The scope of the book is to address worldly sen-
sibility and our involvements within it. This is a 
phenomenological issue, Hansen explains, which 
nonetheless emerges from a technological condi-
tion that phenomenology is unable to engage with 
because of its insistence on relating sensation to 
human perception and consciousness. For Hansen, 
Whitehead is the philosopher that might come to 
the rescue here, for he might give us just the right 
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ontology to conceptualize this worldly sensibility 
and, at the same time, to advance a non-anthropo-
morphic and non-representational phenomenology 
able to address technology beyond its prosthetic 
coupling with human capacities. It is precisely at this 
ontological level, however, that Hansen adds most of 
his corrections to Whitehead’s account, with a view 
towards forging this reformed phenomenology. These 
corrections result in a Whiteheadian ontology that is, 
in fact, somewhat non-Whiteheadian: eternal objects 
are not eternal anymore; actual occasions do not end, 
but indefinitely converge into an imperishable ‘total 
power’; the atomic processuality of Whitehead’s many 
beings (indeed, the actual occasions) is overlooked in 
order to give room to a holistic Being-of-the world 
that would seem to belong more to phenomenology 
(or to the neo-materialism and aﬀective turn from 
which Hansen would want to detach his phenom-
enology of media) than to Whitehead himself.
The value of Feed-Forward is that it contributes 
to both Whiteheadian scholarship and media theory 
with a thought-provoking proposition, achieved 
by way of rigorous philosophical commitment 
and labour. However, whilst the book opens up 
and reworks Whitehead’s philosophy, the techno-
operations that it addresses remain, to an extent, 
black-boxed. Hansen’s term ‘twenty-first-century 
media’ is intended to denote a plethora of ‘technical 
incursions that are now reshaping our lives’. These 
include social media platforms, the Internet and 
global networks, smartphones and smart devices, 
location-aware technologies, data-mining and data-
gathering techniques, biometric recording, and the 
‘passive sensing’ of what Hansen calls ‘microcompu-
tational sensors’. Twenty-first-century media diﬀer 
from their predecessors, because they do not rely on 
agent-centred perception. Instead, they pertain to 
(and enhance human contact with) an environmental 
mode of sensibility. Yet, quite what these ‘intelligent 
sensing technologies’ really are, and indeed where 
their intelligence might lie, is not tackled; at least not 
in a manner that goes beyond observing and concep-
tualizing what these technologies do to us, and to 
our relation with the world. In other words, Hansen 
chooses to focus on the ways in which twenty-first-
century media inscribe human experience into 
worldly sensibility, as opposed to theorizing how a 
‘computational sensing’ might actually be carried out 
by machines.
‘Feed-forward’ is the book’s central concept. It 
aims to surpass the Husserlian notion of proten-
tion in order to describe the data-driven anticipatory 
structure of the ‘experiential paradigm’ engendered 
by twenty-first-century media. Feed-forward ‘names 
the operation through which the technically accessed 
data of sensibility enters into futural moments of 
consciousness as radical intrusions from the outside’. 
This ‘presentification’ of data to consciousness is, 
Hansen argues, ‘the principal mode in which con-
temporary consciousness can experience … its own 
operationality’. However, the fact that the twenty-
first-century media’s ‘calculative ontology of predic-
tion’ is indeed about calculation remains opaque in 
this conceptualization of feeding-forward mecha-
nisms. Despite identifying the role of calculation 
vis-à-vis prediction, Hansen does not fully address 
it. I see this as a problem: for if twenty-first-century 
media’s anticipatory nature is indeed about calcula-
tion – and I would argue that this is the case – then 
it must concern a computational power that not only 
presents and presentifies data, but also has to repre-
sent the latter via symbolic but functional reductions.
The decision to not engage more directly with 
the calculative nature of twenty-first-century media 
could, however, be read as Hansen taking a specific 
philosophical stance. In other words, he would seem 
to be choosing phenomenology over Whitehead by 
implicitly asserting that, because we do not have 
direct access to these computational operations, we 
should not speak of them. It is therefore legitimate 
to wonder whether ultimately Hansen has remained 
loyal to phenomenology’s focus on describing the 
‘experiential’ by favouring the latter category over a 
more strictly and peculiarly Whiteheadian considera-
tion of the ‘speculative’. From this perspective, it is 
possible to say that, although the book recognizes 
that it is the speculative that grounds the experiential 
in Whitehead, its very own speculative contribution 
aims to assess the reality of techno-human experience 
rather than that of twenty-first-century media per 
se. In this sense, what the book aﬀords is less a 
Whiteheadian ontology of media technology than 
a Whiteheadian phenomenology of contemporary 
media situations.
M. Beatrice Fazi
